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Constantly rising expenditures for pharmaceuticals require government in-
tervention in firms’ pricing decisions. To this end, reference pricing systems
are a frequently employed regulatory mechanism. This paper considers a
duopoly market with vertically differentiated firms under different competi-
tion types. Starting from the existing literature it can be confirmed that the
introduction of a reference price leads to lower equilibrium prices and induces
fiercer competition between firms. Further, it can be shown that reference
pricing promotes generic usage and leads to an increased market coverage.
Hence, an improved provision of medical supply is achieved due to the lower
prices and the stimulated demand for drugs. The paper demonstrates that
even under the increased demand consumer and insurance expenditures are
reduced. The model isolates the mechanisms of reference pricing and shows
the effects on the consumer decisions. Lastly, consumer surplus increases
when implementing the regulation.
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1 Introduction and Literature Review
Worldwide, the market for pharmaceuticals is subject to various regulations. Rising ex-
penditures of statutory health insurances and increasing fees for patients due to high drug
prices have led to a multitude of regulatory instruments. The pharmaceutical market
is highly innovative and always subject to change: a variety of new drugs is introduced
continually to the market, bringing therapeutic advantages for the patients. Besides the
original drugs there exist cheaper alternatives as generics or branded copies. The former
can enter the market after patent expiry only, while the latter via “inventing” around can
directly enter. Generics as well as branded copies treat the same diseases as the associated
original drug. Generics are (more or less exact) copies of the original brand-name drug
- containing the same active substance with varying additive components (therapeutic
and chemical equivalence) - while branded copies consist of different active substances
(only therapeutic equivalence). Consequently, they are not violating the patent protec-
tion (“inventing” around) and can enter the market at the same time (simultaneous price
competition). Generic versions due to their chemical equivalence have to wait for the
patent expiry for market entry (sequential price competition). Patients often do not know
about these cheaper alternatives or believe that they are of inferior quality. Therefore,
patients tend to purchase high-priced brand-name drugs instead of their alternatives.
In order to handle the increase in expenditures and to overcome the high price difference
between these drug types, reference pricing systems are implemented in several countries
(i.a., Germany, France, Spain). Patients insured via a statutory health insurance only
have to bear a (percentage) part of the drug price (“copayment”) in addition to their
(fixed) insurance premium while the remaining amount is funded by their insurance. Con-
sequently, patients do not fully consider the high price difference between the brand-name
drug and its therapeutic alternatives. Here intervenes the reference price by imposing a
further payment for the consumers when purchasing the brand-name drug. Additionally
to their copayment they have to pay the amount by which the brand-name’s price is higher
than the respective reference price.
This type of regulation has been analyzed in theoretical and empirical work. The first
relevant contribution concerning the competition between brand-name drugs and generic
versions was contributed by Grabowski and Vernon (1992). They derived that while
brand-name prices steadily increase, the prices of generic versions will remain low due
to the competition among them. Scherer (1993) found that after generic entry when
the original product’s patent expired the brand-name producers maintained their high-
price-strategy (“generic competition paradox”). This finding was confirmed by Frank and
Salkever (1997). These results reveal the need for regulation. More recently Pavcnik
(2002) found in an empirical study that reference pricing leads to lower prices for both
firms, while the decrease was even stronger for the brand-name firm. Various academic
works found that besides of decreasing prices, reference pricing intensifies competition
(Brekke et al. 2007, 2009, 2011, 2016, Pavcnik 2002). Recently, Antoñanzas et al. (2017)
analyzed the effect of reference pricing under exogenous and endogenous reference pricing
systems on the price setting.
Building on the existing literature, this paper identifies the mechanisms of reference pricing
in stimulating generic market shares and reducing consumer and insurance expenditures.
Further, reference pricing increases market coverage while simultaneously reducing expen-
ditures: the increase in demand is compensated by a sufficiently large decrease in prices.
The improved medical supply in combination with lower prices lead to an increase in con-
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sumer surplus. Furthermore, the paper points out the shortcomings of reference pricing
and depicts where the regulation fails to accomplish its objectives.
Adopting a similar market set-up as Merino-Castelló (2003), this paper differs from the
consisting literature in several ways. Simultaneous and sequential price competition will
be analyzed alongside, emphasizing the differences and clarify the economic relevance of
both competition types. The effects of the copayment rate and especially of the mecha-
nism of the reference price on the market outcomes will be assessed. Also the effect on the
market coverage and consumers’ and insurance expenditures will be analyzed and the re-
sults for consumer and producer surplus are derived. Besides, by means of an exogenously
given price cap (i.a. Brekke et al. (2011)) the superiority of reference pricing is proven.
Hereafter, the paper is organized as follows: the second part deals with the model set-up
and then introduces the reference price under sequential and simultaneous competition.
The third part shortly considers a price cap to show that exogenous regulation cannot
achieve a satisfactory solution. The last part concludes.
2 Reference Pricing
2.1 Set-up
The paper examines a duopolistic market with a brand-name firm (i = 1) producing an
original drug and a firm (i = 2) producing either a generic version or a branded copy
depending on the considered competition type.1 A constant copayment rate, k ϵ [0, 1],
which the consumers face when purchasing a drug is assumed. Thus, the patients bear a
proportional part of the drug costs while the remaining amount is covered by the statutory
health insurance. The brand-name drug 1 and the drug of firm 2 differ in their perceived2
quality θi, with i = 1, 2 and 0 < θ2 < θ1 ≤ 1. To enter the market the drugs are required
to provide a minimum quality level, i.e. some bioequivalence criteria. The upper quality
bound can be interpreted as the current research status (“state-of-the-art”).
The consumers are uniformly distributed according to their drug valuation τ ϵ [0, 1]. Con-
sumers with a relatively high valuation prefer the brand-name drug, those are willing to
pay a higher price for the high (perceived) quality. Consumers with a lower drug valuation
are not committed to purchasing a specific drug and, therefore, will decide to purchase
the alternative drug due to its lower price.
The utility from buying one unit of the drug is given by the direct utility from drug
consumption (as the product of the consumers’ valuation and the quality) minus the con-
sumer’s copayment, i.e. ci. The consumers’ utility is defined as
U(τ, θi) =
{
τθi − ci if consumer buys one unit
0 otherwise.
With the copayment
ci =
{
kp1 + (p1 − pR) for i = 1
kp2 for i = 2.
1The analysis applies only to drugs which are available on prescription and therefore covered by
the statutory health insurance. Over-the-counter products are not included.
2Uninformed consumers might perceive the alternative drug as being of inferior quality.
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With both firms charging positive prices pi, i = 1, 2. The endogenous reference price is
defined as a linear combination of the two drug prices
pR = αp2 + (1− α)p1
where α ϵ [0, 1]. The limit case of α = 0 in the subsequent results describes the unregulated
situation. The higher the weight the more restrictive the regulation and, hence, the
lower the implemented reference price. It has to hold for each consumer that the utility
from purchasing drug i has to be higher than the utility from purchasing drug j, i.e.
U(τ, θi) ≥ U(τ, θj), with i, j = 1, 2, i ̸= j. Consumers only buy a drug if their utility is non-
negative. When a consumer decides to buy the brand-name drug, he is additionally charged
the difference between the brand-name drug’s price and the reference price. The consumer
indifferent between the brand-name drug and its alternative is located at τ1 ≥ (k+α)(p1−p2)θ1−θ2and the consumer indifferent between the alternative drug and no purchase is located at
τ2 ≥ kp2θ2 3. The demand system follows as depicted in Figure 1.
0 1τ2 τ1
τ
D2 D1
Figure 1: Demand System
Hence, the demand functions read D1 = 1 − τ1 and D2 = τ1 − τ2. The demand for drug
2 reacts more sensitive to price changes than the demand for the brand-name drug, i.e.
∂D2
∂p2
< ∂D1∂p1 . The firms’ profits are given by the sum of the direct revenues obtained fromthe consumers and the revenues obtained from the statutory health insurance. Production
costs are assumed to be zero.4 Then the firm profit is
max
pi
pii = kpiDi︸ ︷︷ ︸
consumers
+(1− k)piDi︸ ︷︷ ︸
insurance
= piDi , i = 1, 2. (1)
2.2 Sequential Price Competition
Sequential price competition depicts the competition between a brand-name drug and its
generic version, which can enter the market with a time delay after patent expiry only.
Firm 1 (brand-name firm as market leader) anticipates the reaction of the follower given
by the reaction function of firm 2
RS2 (p1) ≡ pS2 =
(k + α)θ2
2(kθ1 + αθ2)
pS1 . (2)
Resulting in the reduced-form optimization problem for firm 1:
max
pS1
piS1 = p
S
1
[
1− (k + α)(2kθ1 + (α− k)θ2)
2(θ1 − θ2)(kθ1 + αθ2) p
S
1
]
3It is assumed that τ1 > τ2, the proof can be given by substituting the prices calculated in the
following and is robust for each competition type.
4Further, the costs for the quality development and R& D expenditures are assumed to be sunk
and are neglected here.
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The resulting equilibrium prices are
pS1 =
(θ1 − θ2)(kθ1 + αθ2)
(k + α)(2kθ1 + (α− k)θ2) and p
S
2 =
θ2(θ1 − θ2)
2(2kθ1 + (α− k)θ2) .
The lower the reference price, the more the firms will decrease their prices, i.e. ∂pSi∂α < 0.
The brand-name firm is directly affected via the additional copayment. Firm 2 realizes
an indirect effect. Since prices are strategic complements, firm 2’s price decreases under
a more restrictive reference price, too. Nevertheless, the decrease in the price of firm 2 is
comparably small, i.e. ∂pS1∂α <
∂pS2
∂α . Figure (5) in the appendix reveals that firm 1 reacts
stronger to the implementation of the reference price. The copayment rate negatively
affects the pricing decision of both firms, i.e. ∂pSi∂k < 0. The relative price ratio decreases
in the weight of the reference price, hence, fiercer price competition can be induced by the
regulation:
∂(pS1 /p
S
2 )
∂α
=
2kθ22 − 2kθ1θ2
(k + α)2θ22
< 0
In contrast the influence of the copayment rate on the relative price ratio is positive - a
higher copayment decreases the competition intensity between the two firms:
∂(pS1 /p
S
2 )
∂k
=
2αθ1θ2 − 2αθ22
(k + α)2θ22
> 0
The generic market share under sequential competition results in equilibrium as
γS =
∑2
i=1Di
D2
=
kθ1 + αθ2
3kθ1 + 2αθ2 − kθ2
with i = 1, 2. The more restrictive the reference price is, the higher the generic market
share will be:
∂γS
∂α
=
kθ1θ2 − kθ22
(3kθ1 + 2αθ2 − kθ2)2 > 0
Consumers tend to purchase more of the generic drug when a low reference price is im-
plemented. However, the higher demand for generic drugs is not due to a switch of the
consumers from the brand-name drug to the generic version. The consumption decision
can be analyzed when examining the location of the respective indifferent consumer. When
substituting for the equilibrium prices, the consumer who is indifferent between the two
drug types is not affected by the reference price, i.e. τS1 = 1/2. The higher generic usage
results from a movement of the location of the second indifferent consumer to the left,
i.e. ∂τS2∂α < 0. The fraction of consumers who do not purchase decreases. So while con-
sumers cannot be incentivized to switch from the brand-name drug to its generic version,
nevertheless, a higher market coverage is induced by the reference price
QS =
2∑
i=1
qi =
3kθ1 + 2αθ2 − kθ2
2(2kθ1 + (α− k)θ2)
with i = 1, 2 and ∂QS∂α > 0, ∂Q
S
∂k < 0. So while prices are lower when firms are regulated,
the demand for drugs increases since consumers have to pay less for their drugs. Hence, it
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is possible to identify two contrary effects on consumer expenditures: lower prices decrease
expenditures, while higher demanded quantities increase those. Consumer expenditures
are defined as
CE =
2∑
i=1
kpiqi (3)
with i = 1, 2. The effect of the price decrease dominates the higher demand, therefore,
consumer expenditures unambiguously decrease under reference pricing. The same holds
true for insurance expenditures
IE =
2∑
i=1
(1− k)piqi. (4)
with i = 1, 2. Hence, overall expenditures incurred by consumers and insurance decrease
under regulation. Figure (2) depicts the expenditures, i.e. ES = CE+IE. Assuming that
the brand-name drug’s quality is state-of-the-art, i.e. θ1 = 1 , and the copayment rate is
k = 0.1, which resembles the German copayment rate, the development of the expenditures
in dependence of the reference price and the difference in perceived quality can be shown.
Expenditures are the highest when no regulation is applied (α = 0) and when consumers
perceive a high qualitative difference between the drugs (θ2 = 0). When implementing the
reference price a huge decrease in expenditures appears, visible in the kink at α = 0.2. So
even a relatively high reference price leads to a sharp cut in expenditures.
0
0.5
0
1
0
1.5
ES
0.2
2
0.2
2.5
2
0.4 0.4
0.60.6 0.80.8 1
Figure 2: Expenditures, sequential competition, θ1 = 1, k = 0.1
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Resulting from the decrease in consumer expenditures consumer surplus increases:
CS =
∫ 1
τ1
(τθ1 − kp1)dτ +
∫ τ1
τ2
(τθ2 − kp2)dτ (5)
The more restrictive the regulation the better the situation for consumers. Figure (3)
depicts the development in consumer surplus for varying reference pricing and perceived
quality difference. As expected consumer surplus increases as the regulation becomes
stricter and the perceived quality difference decreases. Hence, to obtain a higher con-
sumer surplus regulators should inform the patients about the non-existence of a quality
difference. If consumers perceive the generics as being of high quality the consumer sur-
plus could be increased. As in the case of expenditures the introduction of a reference
price (moving from α = 0 to α = 0.2) leads to a strong increase in consumer surplus.
0.1
1
0.2
0.8 1
0.3
CS
S
0.8
0.4
2
0.6 0.6
0.5
0.40.4
0.2
0.2 0
Figure 3: Consumer Surplus, sequential competition, θ1 = 1, k = 0.1
Finally, it remains to calculate the profits of the two firms as their producer surplus:
piS1 =
(θ1 − θ2)(kθ1 + αθ2)
2(α+ k)(2kθ1 + (α− k)θ2)
piS2 =
θ2(θ1 − θ2)(kθ1 + αθ2)
4(2kθ1 + (α− k)θ2)2
In contrast to the consumer surplus, the producer surplus, ΠS = piS1 + piS2 , decreases if a
more restrictive reference price is implemented. The increase demand cannot compensate
for the loss due to the lower prices, the profits of both firms decrease. Figure (4) provides
the development of producer surplus. Producers undergo a huge loss in surplus when
reference pricing is introduced. On behalf of the brand-name firm it is preferable that the
original drug is perceived as being of high-quality in comparison to the generic version.
The high level of differentiation would facilitate the high-price-strategy of firm 1. The
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larger share of the loss in producer surplus originates from firm 1, see figure (6) in the
appendix. The brand-name producer’s profits undergo a larger loss due to the stronger
decrease in the price of the original drug.
0
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Figure 4: Producer Surplus, sequential competition, θ1 = 1, k = 0.1
2.3 Simultaneous Price Competition
Due to the minor economic relevance the findings from simultaneous price competition
will only be shortly summarized. The situation of competition between brand-names and
branded copies is less common. Only a comparably small share of drugs is categorized as
branded copies. From the optimization problem (1) result the equilibrium prices of the
two firms:
pB1 =
2(θ1 − θ2)(kθ1 + αθ2)
(k + α)(4(kθ1 + αθ2)− (k + α)θ2)
pB2 =
θ2(θ1 − θ2)
4(kθ1 + αθ2)− (k + α)θ2 ,
A more restrictive reference price leads to lower prices of both firms, i.e. ∂pRBi∂α < 0,
i = 1, 2. The direction of the effect of the copayment on the prices under reference pricing
is unchanged, i.e. ∂pBi∂k < 0, i = 1, 2.
A lower reference price induces fiercer price competition by reducing the relative price
ratio:
∂(pB1 /p
B
2 )
∂α
=
2kθ22 − 2kθ1θ2
(α+ k)2θ22
< 0
A higher copayment for the patients leads to weaker price competition between the two
firms, i.e. ∂(pB1 /pB2 )∂k > 0. The crucial difference to sequential competition is that the market
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share of the branded copy is constant under simultaneous price competition, i.e. γBR = 13 .
The reference price cannot induce a higher usage of the alternative to the brand-name
drug. The constant share of the branded copy is due to a parallel movement to the left
of both indifferent consumers, which is reflected in ∂τBi∂α < 0, i = 1, 2. Nevertheless, this
leftward shift of both locations of indifferent consumers results in an increased market
coverage
QB =
3(kθ1 + αθ2)
4(kθ1 + αθ2)− (k + α)θ2
with ∂QB∂α > 0 and ∂Q
B
∂k < 0. Both drug types face an increased demand, due to the lower
prices more consumers decide to purchase. Still, the decrease in prices is high enough to
compensate for the higher demand and leads to a decrease in consumer (3) and insurance
expenditures (4) respectively. Consequently, consumer surplus, as given by equation (5),
increases due to their lower expenditures for the drugs. On the contrary producer surplus,
ΠB, of both firms decrease under more restrictive reference pricing:
piB1 =
4(θ1 − θ2)(kθ1 + αθ2)2
(k + α)(4(kθ1 + αθ2)− (k + α)θ2)2
piB2 =
θ2(θ1 − θ2)(kθ1 + αθ2)
(4(kθ1 + αθ2)− (k + α)θ2)2
The effects of the interaction between the intensity of regulation and the perceived quality
difference are qualitatively comparable to those under sequential price competition. The
key difference between the two competition types is the independence of the branded-
copy’s market share of the reference price.
3 Price Cap
Reference pricing might not achieve all desired regulative outcomes, but to show that an
exogenous regulation of prices performs even poorer, an exogenously given and binding
price cap for the brand-name drug 1, p1 = p¯1 is assumed. Substituting this price cap p¯1
into the price reaction function of firm 2 yields the generic price pPC2 = θ22θ1 p¯1.A first shortcoming of this kind of regulation becomes visible in the price ratio which does
not change in comparison to the benchmark case (α = 0), i.e. p¯1
pPC2
= 2θ1θ2 . Hence, the
price cap cannot induce fiercer competition. Further, it is sufficient to solve for the generic
market share
γPC =
kθ1p¯1
(θ1 − θ2)(2θ1 − kp¯1) .
The generic market share is increasing in the price cap, i.e. ∂γPC∂p¯1 > 0. Consequently,decreasing the price cap leads to a lower generic market share, which constitutes a second
shortcoming. A regulator would implement the lowest possible price cap to induce low
prices, but this does not stimulate generic usage. A change in the price cap of a regulated
product leads to a change in the same direction for the non-regulated product since prices
are strategic complements. The price cap directly reduces prices but cannot overcome the
price difference between the two drugs.
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4 Conclusion
By shortly considering a price cap regulation it could be shown that it leads to lower
prices, but it is neither capable of introducing fiercer price competition, nor promoting
generic usage. Hence, applying a price cap will not lead to the intended results of the
market regulation.
Applying reference pricing proves more useful in achieving the intentions of the regulation.
While the brand-name drug’s quantity stays constant under reference pricing (sequential
price competition), the quantity of the generic drug increases. Consequently, this leads to
a higher generic market share and an increased market coverage. This is due to the effect
of the reference pricing on the location of the consumer indifferent between purchasing the
generic drug and no purchase at all. The lower prices shift the location of the indifferent
consumer to the left: the higher the weight of the reference price the more the location
shifts to the left. Turning to the expenditures it could be shown that the consumer ex-
penditures as well as the insurance expenditures can be reduced when implementing a
reference pricing system. Thus, the price decrease is sufficiently large to offset the effect
of the increased demand on expenditures.
When introducing the regulation (from α = 0 to α = 0.2) especially the brand-name’s
price drops crucially, whereas a further tightening of the regulation only leads to moderate
decreases. This drop in prices drastically reduces expenditures and leads to an increase
in consumer surplus. Clearly firms suffer under the regulation, whereby the reduction in
producer surplus mainly originates from the loss in profits of the brand-name firm.
The decrease in prices and the intensified price competition are also visible under simulta-
neous price competition. The equilibrium quantities increase, since more consumers decide
to buy a drug due to lower prices. Nevertheless, the reference price is not able to induce a
higher market share of firm 2. The usage of the branded-copy cannot be stimulated. The
reference price influences the locations of both indifferent consumers (via α). Both loca-
tions shift to the left, hence, increasing market coverage. But since this shift is parallel,
the market share of firm 2 stays constant. The effects on expenditures and surpluses are
similar to those under sequential price competition.
This paper confirmed the advantage of a reference pricing system in introducing fiercer
price competition. Additionally, it demonstrated that under sequential price competition
the generic market share increased as a consequence of the reference price. Sequential
price competition is the more common type of competition on the pharmaceutical market.
After patent expiry brand-name drugs are more often followed by generic versions instead
of being threatened by firms inventing around the patent and coming up with branded
copies. Furthermore, the improved market coverage shows that a reference price ensures
that more consumers have access to medical treatment. Additionally, it could be shown
that consumer and insurance expenditures decrease crucially under regulation - even when
considering the increase in demand. Consequently, this leads to increased consumer sur-
plus.
Of course introducing reference prices might lead to further changes in the insurance sys-
tem, like an adjustment of the fixed health care contributions, as well as to effects on
the firms’ R& D investment decisions. However, these issues are beyond the scope of this
paper.
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Figure 5: Prices, sequential competition, θ1 = 1, k = 0.1
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Figure 6: Profits, sequential competition, θ1 = 1, k = 0.1
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